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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES 
TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY, 
Appellant, 
VS. 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 16000 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a suit challenging the constitutionality and 
legality of those taxes which Salt Lake City imposes on the 
gross revenue derived from that part of Plaintiff's telephone 
business which is conducted within Salt Lake City. Plaintiff 
claims that other businesses are permitted to compete with 
Plaintiff within Salt Lake City without paying the same taxes 
required of Plaintiff. Plaintiff also claims that the most 
recent increase in the challenged taxes operates as an imper-
missible utility rate increase. 
II. DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Law and Motion Division of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Honorable David K. Winder, granted Defendant 
Salt Lake City's motion for summary judgment and dismissed 
Plaintiff's complaint. 
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III. NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant asks this Court to reverse the judgment of 
the District Court and to remand the case for trial. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
By its ordinance set out in Bill No. 110 of 1977, 
published July 1, 1977 (R. 172), Salt Lake City increased the 
utility revenue tax it imposes on that part of Plaintiff's 
business which is conducted within Salt Lake City to a total 
of eight percent, including the two percent component of the 
total revenue tax which has historically been known as the 
franchise fee. 
During the period when the bill amending this section 
of the ordinance was being considered by the city's Board of 
Commissioners, various discussions and written communications 
took place between Plaintiff and Defendant with respect to the 
question of what competition Plaintiff was experiencing in the 
Salt Lake City market for telephone equipment. A summary of 
the information which Plaintiff provided Defendant with respect 
to this question is contained in that letter dated June 29, 1977, 
which, together with its attachments, appears as Exhibit "1" to 
that affidavit of Kenneth R. Madsen dated June 22, 1978 (R. 269-
296). That letter informed Defendant of the existence of six 
companies active in the Salt Lake market whose principal business 
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consists of or includes direct competition with Plaintiff and 
who provide telephone terminal equipment on terms and condi-
tions virtually identical to those of the Plaintiff telephone 
company (R. 272, 279-284). Defendant was also provided with 
the identities of some of Plaintiff's major accounts which had 
been lost to these companies during the prior year (R. 279-284). 
Defendant was further informed of the existence of an extensive 
number of retail outlets which were selling telephone equipment 
in competition with Plaintiff, but whose sales would not be 
subject to the eight percent tax which is challenged in this 
suit (R. 272-78). 
On July 26, 1977, Defendant passed an ordinance pur-
porting to impose a six percent tax on businesses in competition 
with Plaintiff. Section 20-3-14.1 Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 1965 (R. 14; para. 10). The pleadings reflect 
a dispute as to whether Defendant has ever collected any tax 
from Plaintiff's competitors pursuant to this provision. Plain-
tiff's complaint alleges that no such tax has been collected 
(R. 6; para. 20). Defendant's answer denies this allegation 
(R. 14, para. 11), but Defendant has not presented by affidavit 
any evidence that it has collected this tax. 
As part of the information received by Defendant with 
respect to this tax, Defendant was informed by the Washington, 
D. C. counsel for four of Plaintiff's competitors that these 
-3-
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four companies had sold $270,000 worth of telephone equipment 
in Salt Lake City during 1976, and that these companies esti-
mated that this sum represented 43% of the telephone equipment 
of this type sold in Salt Lake City during 1976 (R. 297-99). 
Plaintiff alleges in its complaint that it is required 
by orders issued by the Utah Public Service Commission to collect 
taxes of the type at issue in this suit from those customers 
who use its services within the limits of Salt Lake City; and 
that under the facts of this case, the challenged amendment 
operated as a utility rate increase (R. 4, para. 11). Defendant 
denied, for lack of information and belief, the allegation that 
Plaintiff has c0~olied with the applicable orders of the Public 
Service Commission (R. 13, para. 5), and denied that the 
challenged tax increase operated as a utility rate increase. 
Defendant moved for SQmmary judgment on several 
grounds. The District Court granted Defendant's motion, stat-
ing in its memorandum decision only that: 
"It is the opinion of the Court that the fran-
chise fee and the utility revenue tax in question 
in this case, and which have been imposed by the 
defendant upon the plaintiff are valid and con-
stitutional and have not been disproportionately 
(as compared with other businesses similarly 
situated) taxed upon the plaintiff and so as 
to be violative of either the Constitution of 
Utah or the United States Constitution." 
(R. 447). 
-4-
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V. ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS 
THAT IT HAS COMPETITORS WHO ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PAY THE TAX 
AT ISSUE RAISE DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
l. The Allegations and their Evidentiary Support. 
The District Court was presented with an undisputed 
factual showing that a drastic change had occurred with respect 
to the extent to which Plaintiff is required to compete with 
other companies in the sale or lease of telephone equipment. 
In 1974, the Federal Communications Commission, in that series 
of cases which have come to be known in the telecommunications 
industry as "The Interconnect Cases," issued an order which had 
the effect of initiating nationwide competition in the sale of 
telephone equipme~t. This order, In the Matter of Telerant 
Leasing Co~., 45 F.C.C. 2d 204 (1974) was presented to the 
District Court by affidavit and is part of the Record on Appeal 
(R. 327-49). 
An explanation of the background of this decision 
is necessary to show its impact on the case before this Court. 
In Carterfone v. AT&T, 13 F.C.C. 2d 420 (1968), the F.C.C. 
ruled that federal tariffs governing the conduct of telephone 
utility companies could not prohibit the connection of telephones 
and switchboards manufactured by other companies to telephone 
networks used in interstate commerce. The Carterfone decision, 
did not, however, prescribe any specific interconnection policy 
-5-
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for telephone utilities. The utilities responded to the Carter-
fane decision by filing tariffs which permitted connection to 
the interstate telephone system of telephones and switchboards 
manufactured by independent manufacturers so long as the in-
stallation included certain specified electronic protective 
devices which had to be provided by the utility companies. 
In the early 1970's, some state utility commissions 
gave notice that they planned to issue tariffs prohibiting inter-
connection of telephones and switchboards manufactured by 
sources other than the utility companies to any telephone ex-
change except where the telephones and switchboards were used 
exclusively for ::.:1terstate communication. In the 1974 Telerant 
decision, the Federal Communications Commission issued an order 
declaring that state regulatory commissions had no power to 
issue tariffs which were more restrictive with respect to inter-
connection than the then applicable F.C.C. tariffs unless it 
could be shown that such state tariffs would apply solely to 
communications within that state. The Fourth Circuit affirmed 
the F.C.C. 's Telerant ruling in the 1974 case of North Carolina 
Utilities Commission v. F.C.C. (hereinafter referred to as 
North Carolina I), 537 F.2d 787 (Fourth Cir. 1976), Cert. denied, 
97 S. C.T. 651 (1976). 
The Carterfone an9 Telerant rulings were further 
broadened by the F.C.C. inits case, Docket No. 19528, which was 
-6-
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also affirmed by the Fourth Circuit in North Carolina Utilities 
Commission v. F.C.C. (hereinafter referred to as North Carolina 
II), 552 F.2d 1026 (Fourth Cir. 1976). In that case, the F.C.C. 
ruled that telephone company tariffs governing interstate com-
munication would be required to allow connection to the telephone 
lines of any terminal equipment which had been registered with 
the F.C.C. in accordance with a registration program established 
by the Docket 19528 Order. The effect of this ruling was to 
permit the attachment of any registered terminal equipment to 
the national telephone network without being forced to use 
intermediate electronic protective devices supplied by telephone 
utility companies. The history of the interconnect cases and 
the significance of their impact on the telecommunications 
industry is set forth in the Fourth Circuit ruling in the 
North Carolina II case, a copy of which was presented to the 
District Court by affidavit and which appears as Pages 301-326 
of the Record on Appeal in this matter. 
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in the North Carolina II 
case points out that the net legal effect of the interconnect 
cases was to deprive telephone utility companies of the "private 
lawmaking authority" they had previously enjoyed over indepen-
dent manufacturers of telephone equipment. 552 F.2d 1035 at 
1051. The practical effect of the interconnect cases was to 
stimulate companies other than telephone utility companies to 
-7-
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start manufacturing and selling telephone equipment. The 
success of some of these companies is dramatically illustrated 
by the letter from their counsel to Defendant, which appears at 
Pages 298-300 of the Record on Appeal. This letter indicates 
that by 1976, four of these companies had captured what they 
were willing to estimate was 43% of the market for telephone 
equipment in Salt Lake City. These companies further repre-
sented to Defendant that they had collectively sold some 
$270,000 worth of telephone equipment within Salt Lake City in 
that year. The letter and attachments at Pages 272-278 of the 
Record shows tru~ by June of 1977, more than 50 retail outlets, 
including most of the major department stores in Salt Lake, 
were selling telephone equipment in direct competition with 
Plaintiff. Salt Lake City ~as given all these businesses a 
competitive advantage over Plaintiff by requiring Plaintiff to 
add 8% to the cost of the telephone equipment it sells or 
leases, while not requiring that other businesses pay the same 
tax on the telephone equipment which they sell or lease. 
2. The Materiality of the Allegations. 
The facts set out above were presented to the District 
Court by affidavit, and were not disputed by Defendant. Al-
though the Court did not discuss how it had dealt with these 
facts in reaching its decis_ion on Defendant's Motion for Surrnnary 
Judgment, the most reasonable inference appears to be that the 
-8-
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Court must have accepted the argument presented by Defendant in 
its memorandum in support of its motion to the effect that the 
holding of this Court in the case of Mountain States Telephone 
& Telegraph Company v. Ogden City, 26 U.2d 487 P.2d 849 (1971), 
stands for the proposition that Defendant has no legal obliga-
tion, regardless of what level of economic competition Plaintiff 
may be experiencing, other than to tax Plaintiff at the same 
rate at which it taxes the other two utility companies which 
operate within the city. The Ogden City case, however, was 
decided before the Federal Communication Commission's ruling in 
the Telerant case discussed above, and at a time when Plaintiff 
was not experiencing competition in the sale of telephone equip-
ment as alleged and adduced by affidavit in this matter. 
The existence of this competition brings the facts of 
this case within the holding of this Court's decision in Salt 
Lake City v. Utah Light & Railway Co., 45 U.SO, 142 P. 1067 
(1914). In that case, Salt Lake City passed an ordinance which 
prohibited engaging in the business of furnishing, distributing 
or selling electricity, where meters were used to gauge or 
measure the electricity, without procuring a license from the 
city so to do. The ordinance further provided for an annual 
license fee of $1.00 for each electric meter used by the 
license holder. The opinion shows that although plaintiff was 
the only electric company which used meters to measure the 
-9-
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electricity which it sold to its customers, there were at the 
time other companies engaged in selling electricity within Salt 
Lake City. The plaintiff electric company alleged that Salt 
Lake City's ordinance was invalid because it excluded from 
taxation various companies which were in fact competing with 
plaintiff in the sale of electricity within Salt Lake City. 
The opinion notes that then, as now, all of Salt 
Lake City's power to tax businesses operating within its limits 
was conferred on the city by a statute which includes the 
limitation that "all such license fees and taxes shall be uni-
form in respecc ~~ the class upon which they are imposed." 
142 P. at 1070. This language is identical with the present 
language of §10-8-80, Utah Code Annotated. 
In the Utah Light & Railway case, Salt Lake City 
argued that the Court needed only to determine that plaintiff 
was the only utility which used meters to measure the electricity 
it delivered to its customers from which the conclusion would 
follow that it could be taxed in a separate category. This 
Court rejected that method of analysis and examined the eco-
nomic significance of the facts shown in the Record to determine 
whether plaintiff and the companies which were not subject to 
the ordinance were similarly situated. The Court then set out 
in these words the test which is to be applied in testing the 
-10-
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validity of a city's business revenue ordinances: 
"Can the business specified in the ordinance be 
so classified that some of those who are engaged 
therein may be required to pay the tax, while 
others who are conducting the same business are 
not required to do so? Clearly not." 142 P. at 
1071. 
The opinion then explains in greater detail the rea-
soning upon which this test is based: 
"A license tax might not be unjust, though 
laid upon a single occupation, provided that it 
was so laid that none who followed that occupa-
tion escaped it. Let it reach all of a class, 
either of persons or things; it matters not 
whether those included in it may be one or 
many, or whether they reside in any particular 
locality or are scattered all over the state. 
But when, for any reason, it becomes discrimina-
tive between individuals of the class taxed, 
and selects some for an exce tional burden, the 
tax is eprived o the necessary e ement o 
legal equality, and becomes inadmissible." 
(Emphasis added.) 142 P. at 1071. 
It is significant that the foregoing language is 
inconsistent with the fundamental premise upon which Defendant's 
argument is based. In concluding its argument to the District 
on this issue, Defendant stated in its memorandum of points 
and authorities: 
"It is respectfully submitted that the issue of 
classification has already been decided by the 
Utah Supreme Court; however, in any event, the 
case law is abundant and not subject to challenge 
at this date and the classification of the 
Plaintiff and the other utilities is lawful in 
all particulars and within the legislative 
prerogative of Salt Lake City Corporation." 
(R. 430). 
-11-
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Although this language is somewhat unclear, it seems, when read 
in the light of those issues raised by Plaintiff's complaint, 
to mean that Defendant contends that this Court's 1971 Ogden 
Ci~ case, supra, means that Plaintiff can never challenge 
any inequities in those taxes imposed on it by Salt Lake City 
unless such inequities should happen to exist between Plaintiff 
and the two other major utility companies. An adjudication 
that a tax is valid is not as static and permanent as Defendant 
apparently contends. The language quoted above from the Utah 
Light & Railwav case shows that taxing authorities, such as 
Salt Lake City, are subject to the restriction that their taxes, 
even if once reasonat~e, may become discriminatory. When such 
discrimination occurs, the tax is stripped of whatever legality 
it may previously have enjoyed, and becomes unlawful and void. 
This Court then concluded its opinion by commenting on the 
duty of courts when they are presented with facts showing that 
some of those who are engaged in a business are required to 
pay the tax, while others who are conducting the same business 
are not so taxed: 
"Equality, therefore, becomes a safeguard against, 
if not an absolute prevention of, excessive and 
oppressive taxation. Where, however, those who, 
for the time being, are intrusted with the power 
to pass laws or ordinances by which taxation may 
be imposed invade the rule of equality prescribed 
by the paramount law, it is the duty of the courts, 
when proper application is made, to declare such 
-12-
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law or ordinance void, and thus arrest the evil 
at its inception. In doing so the courts are 
not, as it is sometimes popularly assumed, in-
terfering with the law-making power, but are 
merely compelling that power to observe and obey 
the paramount law. For the reasons last stated, 
we are required to declare the ordinance in 
question invalid." (142 P. at 1071-72.) 
It is this duty which Plaintiff contends the District 
Court failed to adequately perform. The District Court's duty 
to diligently safeguard the rule of equality referred to in 
the foregoing quotation from the Utah Light & Railway case is 
augmented in this case by the fact that the question of equality 
of taxation was raised by means of a motion for summary judg-
ment. Because summary judgment has the effect of denying the 
complaining party the right to try its claims, the District 
Court in ruling on such a motion should carefully scrutinize 
the allegations of the complaint and all facts submitted by 
the complainin~ party to discern the existence of any disputed 
fact. In the event any disputed issue of material fact is 
presented, the summary judgment motion should be denied. Rich 
v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976); Singleton v. Alexander, 
19 U.2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967). 
Those facts adduced by Plaintiff which show the 
existence of at least fifty retail outlets in direct competition 
with Plaintiff in the sale of telephone equipment within Salt 
Lake City bring this case within the holding of this Court in 
the case of Orem City v. Pyne, 16 U.2d 355, 401 P.2d 181 (1965). 
In that case, this Court incorporated as its opinion the opinion 
-13-
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of Judge Maurice Harding in case No. 4039, District Court of 
Utah County, State of Utah, which opinion appears at Pages 
263-66 of the Record on Appeal. In that case, the City had 
passed an ordinance which set a fixed annual tax rate for a 
number of businesses listed by type in the ordinance. Another 
section of the same ordinance imposed a tax, based on gross 
sales, on any business not specifically listed in other sec-
tions of the ordinance. This Court held that the taxation 
imposed under that ordinance was unconstitutional because the 
ordinance had the effect of taxing one business which sold 
tangible personal property at a rate which was in some cases 
as much as twe l \'E times the arno-un t of tax required of other 
businesses also selling tangible personal property. In this 
case, the facts alleged in Plaintiff's complaint, and put before 
the District Court by affid-vit, show the existence of many 
retail sellers of tangible personal property which do not pay 
the eight percent tax which plaintiff is required to pay when 
it sells or leases the exact same item of telephone equipment. 
In Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 U. 476, 206 P.2d 
153 (1949), a case in which one of Salt Lake City's ordinances 
was held unconstitutional for failing to regulate uniformly 
different businesses competing in the same type of sales, this 
Court commented on the judiciary's function when presented 
with the allegation that a municipal ordinance subjects the 
-14-
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complaining party to an unconstitutional tax burden: 
"[The Court's function] is to determine whether 
an enactment operates equally upon all persons 
similarly situated. If it does then the dis-
crimination is within permissible legislative 
limits. If it does not, then the differentia-
tion would be without reasonable basis and the 
act does not meet the test of constitutionality." 
206 P.2d 153 at 160. 
In this case, Plaintiff had alleged and put before the District 
Court by affidavit facts showing that although Defendant Salt 
Lake City had been fully informed of the fact that Plaintiff was 
experiencing highly successful competition from other companies 
which had recently been permitted to enter the market for 
telephone equipment. Salt Lake City elected to tax only Plain-
tiff while failing or refusing to insure the Plaintiff's 
similarly situated competitors also paid taxes on some uniform 
basis. Plaintiff contends that the District Court erred in not 
recognizing that these facts were sufficient to raise a disputed 
question of material fact regarding the extent to which the 
legal and economic changes explained in the preceding sections 
of this brief required Salt Lake City to tax Plaintiff's com-
petition uniformly in comparison with the taxes it required of 
Plaintiff. The failure of the District Court to recognize the 
need for equal taxation under these circumstances seems particu-
larly obdurate in light of the fact that the pleadings show 
that Salt Lake City had apparently recognized the existence of 
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this obligation by enacting §20-3-14.1 of its ordinances which 
purported to tax Plaintiff's competition. 
II. THE COURT ERRED IN APPARENTLY RULING THAT THERE EXISTS 
NO SET OF FACTS UNDER WHICH DEFENDANT'S TAX INCREASE 
COULD OPERATE AS A UTILITY RATE INCREASE. 
It is less than clear that the District Court ruled 
on this issue, although the Court's statement that it finds 
the taxes in question to be valid and constitutional (R.447) 
seems to include, by necessary implication, some ruling on this 
issue. That such a ruling was apparently ~ade, in turn 
necessarily implies that the District Court must have concluded 
that there was no way that a municipal ordinance could be 
legally tantamount to a utility rate increase. Plaintiff's 
complaint alleges that the increase imposed by the 1977 amend-
ment operates as a utility rate increase (R. 4). The material-
ity of this allegation does not seem to be disputed by Defendant, 
for it conceded in its argument to the District Court that 
the power to set utility rates is vested solely in the Utah 
Public Service Commission. Plaintiff and Defendant apparently 
also agree that the Public Service Commission's power, dele-
gated by the legislature under Section 54-7-1 et seq., Utah 
Code Annotated, to set utility rates is a separate power from 
that conveyed to the City under Section 10-8-80 permitting it 
to tax for revenue purposes~ (R. 434). 
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Plaintiff's disagreement with Defendant with respect 
to this issue centers on the question of whether the two powers 
have been kept separate under the facts of this case. Defendant 
has presented, by its affidavits, no facts bearing on this 
question; and its argument on this issue is restricted to the 
conclusory assertion, by memorandum of counsel, that the City 
has not improperly set rate structures. Defendant has, accord-
ingly, failed to traverse the allegation of Plaintiff's complaint 
to the effect that, given the pass through nature of the tax 
increase, the tax increase constitutes an impermissible utility 
tax increase. 
The case law authority bearing on the question of 
what constitutes an impermissible utility rate increase uni-
formly supports the position of Plaintiff on this issue. The 
case law on this issue has defined setting a utility rate as 
the taking of some action which determines what rate will be 
charged in the future for utility services. In states such 
as Utah where the legislature has delegated the rate setting 
function to the Public Service Commission, any governmental 
agency which takes an action having the effect of requiring a 
new rate to be paid for utility service has unconstitutionally 
transgressed the limits of its power. This point can perhaps be 
best illustrated by examining those limitations which courts 
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have imposed on themselves in cases dealing with utility rate 
structures. Courts can determine whether existing rates are too 
high or too low, but they cannot prescribe what rate will be 
permissible in the future. Were a court to purport to include 
such a provision in its order with respect to utility rates, the 
court would commit error by usurping a function of the legis-
lative branch of government. Southwestern Bell Telephone Com-
pany v. State of Texas, 526 S.W.2d 526 (Sup. Ct. Tex. 1975); 
Mississippi Public Service Commission v. Horne Telephone Company, 
110 S.2d 618. Similarly, a complaint challenging the phone 
company's practice of ~iving free service to its employees was 
dismissed because the relief sought would, by necessary impli-
cation, have required a rate adjustment. The Court noted that 
this relief could only be obtained from the State Public Service 
Commission; and held that it did not, therefore, have juris-
diction. Dworkin v. Illinois Bell, 340 N.E.2d 98 (Ill. App. 1975). 
The imposition by Salt Lake City of the utility revenue 
tax at issue falls within the definition of imposing a utility 
rate increase. The City has determined that a change in rates 
will be required, the City has determined when the change will 
be effective, and the City has prescribed what the amount of 
the change will be. The City conceded in its argument to the 
District Court (R. 435-36) that it passed the revenue ordinance 
in question relying on the assumption that the tax thus imposed 
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would be passed through to Salt Lake City users of phone service 
in the form of rate increases. When the City, acting as a govern-
ment entity, does those things, the City, no less than a court, 
exceeds the constitutional limits of its power and encroaches 
on the powers delegated to the Public Service Commission by the 
state legislature. 
As was the case with respect to Plaintiff's allega-
tions of discriminatory taxation, the District Court should have 
recognized the existence of disputed fact questions raised by 
Plaintiff's allegations with respect to the effect upon utility 
rates of Defendant's tax increase. This increase was only one 
of a series of such increases by Defendant, and appears to have 
been effected with the express intention of passing the tax 
through to users of telephone service within Salt Lake City. 
In order to rule as it did, the District Court must necessarily 
have ruled without trial that Plaintiff's evidence could never 
result in the conclusion that the City's actions, apparently 
carried out with the intention of causing an increase in utility 
rates within Salt Lake City, were the equivalent of a utility 
rate increase. The standard of review which has been set by 
this Court precluded the District Court, however, from declaring 
this sort of prejudgment on the merits of Plaintiff's evidence. 
Singleton v. Alexander, 19 U.2d at 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The real world in which Plaintiff must conduct its 
business has changed substantially since Plaintiff last chal-
lenged its taxation by Salt Lake City. That change was imposed 
by federal regulations and orders, affirmed by federal courts. 
As a result, Plaintiff now has a great deal of competition in 
areas where it has not had competition during most of this 
century. Defendant was fully informed of the existence of 
this competition, but to this date has chosen to tax Plaintiff 
as it has traditionally done, with the result that Salt Lake 
City is imposing a significant competitive economic disadvan-
tage on Plaintiff If the ruling of the District Court is 
permitted to stand, it is unclear how Plaintiff could challenge 
future tax increases by Defendant and other cities. It does 
not seem overly speculative to suggest that if Plaintiff is 
forced to compete indefinitely under an artificially imposed 
economic disadvantage, Plaintiff must expect to ultimately be 
forced out of a market in which it should have the right to 
compete. It seems unlikely that there will ever be a more 
appropriate time for Plaintiff to ask the judicial system to 
help prevent such a result. 
In addition, the present suit would seem to have 
adequately raised the question of how far a municipality may 
go in raising, directly or indirectly, the utility rates of its 
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residents in order to obtain revenue. While this may initially 
appear to be a relatively painless way for the City to obtain 
continual tax increases, its prolonged and repeated use raises 
questions about the point where the City encroaches on those 
powers committed by law to other agencies and branches of 
government. 
The record indicates that these important questions 
should not be resolved without benefit of a trial and a full 
record and, Plaintiff accordingly requests that this case be 
remanded to 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 1978. 
/( 
M.-~2?~~ 
Gerald R. Millei 
C--~~~'~+./~~~~~~~~­
chris 'Wangsgard 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
McCARTHY 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-3333 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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